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and the Rise of Right-wing
Extremism and Euroscepticism

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The Migration Crisis and the Rise of Right-wing Extremism and Euroscepticism

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Introduction

Neither right-wing extremism nor Euroscepticism are new terms in post-WWII European history. But with the migration crisis ongoing for more than one year, these designations have gained another, very sinister, driving force and dimension. The purpose of this paper is to describe the influence the migration crisis has had on the Visegrad countries, and to compare its impact among the individual Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary).

First, we must define the basic terminology. Far-right politics is infamously associated with the idea of a superior nation to which other nations are inferior. Such inferior nations therefore represent a threat to society and the state. The most vocal proponent of this idea was Adolf Hitler and his Third Reich. Hitler's defeat in 1945 caused a significant decline in the popularity of far-right parties in Europe. Their main goal became survival and until the 1980s they would not even dare to think about having real power in Europe. Nevertheless, far-right parties or extreme right-wing parties started to evolve into the contemporary right-wing parties of the 1980s. In which ways have they changed? First of all, there was an apparent shift, or rather elimination, of the fascist heritage and its main traits. Secondly, far-right parties made use of global

developments at the end of the Cold War—namely liberalization and globalization. They portrayed themselves as anti-globalist movements with a strong anti-immigration [stance](#). Their anti-immigration rhetoric and attitudes are falling on fertile ground in the current landscape.

It should be noted that Euroscepticism is connected with the EU establishment and its further integration as an institution. However, there is a difference between soft and hard Euroscepticism. The hard version rejects EU membership. It is linked to Europhobia, and entirely denies both the economic and political benefits of European integration. The European Parliament's Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, which includes the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), is a major example of hard Eurosceptic organizations and parties.

On the other hand, soft Euroscepticism could be considered a type of Euroscepticism more concerned with reform, which supports not only the existence of the European Union as such, but advocates for membership. Nevertheless, soft Euroscepticism opposes the integration policies of the EU and the federalization of Europe. Put simply, it demands more sovereignty for the nation states at the expense of power emanating from Brussels. It certainly comes as no surprise to anyone interested in politics that the mention

of this term most strongly characterises the United Kingdom. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made her “Bruges Speech” on 20 September 1988, in which she voiced her disagreement with the fact that the European Union overrules the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Eurosceptic sentiments were spreading throughout the 90s, since with new primary documents coming into force (especially Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty), more and more competences were shifted to Brussels at the expense of national states and erosion of their identity.

First and foremost, discussions about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty made Euroscepticism more common. People began to cast doubt upon the benefits of the European Union. Although up until now the largest, so-called Eastern enlargement, that took place in 2004 is by many people considered to be the biggest achievement of European integration (former communist countries became member states). These positive feelings perceived by many pro-European politicians did not fall on the fertile ground among the general public. Another blow came in the 2005 referendums, when the populations of two founding EU member states, France and the Netherlands, rejected the Constitutional Treaty. Moreover, Ireland rejected the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, which only added insult to the injury as far as the rise of Euroscepticism is concerned.

The numbers speak for themselves. Support among citizens in 2007 was at 57%, but in 2014 dropped [to 31%](#). The growing anti-EU (Eurosceptic) tendencies were more than apparent during the elections for the European Parliament in May 2014. Eurosceptic and far-right parties recorded unprecedented success. UKIP (The United Kingdom Independence Party) led by controversial Nigel Farage and the French National Front under the leadership of Marine Le Pen shocked Europe by winning the most seats within their respective countries. Also German Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Greek Golden Dawn

did exceptionally well in these [elections](#).

Although Euroscepticism and right-wing extremism are very close in nature, it is important to distinguish between them. The overwhelming majority of right-wing extremist parties are Eurosceptic as well, however, [right-wing parties do not criticize the European unification process as such, but the way how it proceeds](#).

Apparently, the rise of far-right parties in Europe was clear before the full breakout of the migration crisis in the beginning of 2015. Nevertheless, the main focus of this paper is to analyze the situation of the far-right (Eurosceptic) parties in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic before the migration crisis and how the crisis itself influenced the popularity and functioning of these extreme political entities in their respective countries.

This topic is highly contemporary and timely, since the EU has been facing what is undeniably its greatest challenge since its establishment for over a year already, and the Central European countries have been playing a crucial role on the issue. On the one hand, Visegrad countries have been showing cooperation and mutual support in dealing with it, but the developments related to this burning issue in the four countries have also shown fundamental differences.

Poland

Significant deviation from the EU line and one-party Eurosceptic government

Poland is the largest country among the Visegrad countries, and also among the countries that joined the EU in the 21st century. Therefore, what is going on and who is ruling in this country is very important not only for the country as such, but also for the whole region. The Polish experience with far-right extremism went down in history with the most dreadful statistics in history of the country, but far-right movements became

noticeable on the Polish political scene from [the beginning of 80s](#).

As far as Euroscepticism is concerned, the case of Janusz Korwin-Mikke is a troubling one. This very controversial figure of the Polish political scene established in 2011 a party called Congress of the New Right (KNP). Mikke is widely known for his pro-Russian orientation and strong anti-EU opinions. According to his own words, half of the current EU Commissioners should be arrested, and he also declared that he would [turn the European institution buildings into a brothel](#). In spite of that he is a MEP, because KNP joined a success story of extremist parties in [the EP elections in 2014 by gaining 7,2% of the votes](#). Mikke has been suspended from the EP several times already, and in September 2015 his latest suspension was due to his speech on the migration crisis: "People willing to work are valuable, but they are being sent back to their countries and we take in those unwilling to work. This is a ridiculous policy that results in Europe being flooded with human garbage. Let's state it clear: [human garbage that does not want to work](#)," Korwin-Mikke said in his speech. Mikke's new party called KORWIN did not get into the Polish Sejm in 2015 (4,76%), but another heavily Eurosceptic and far-right party was successful.

Nevertheless, the most prominent far-right political entity in Poland, which is at the same time mildly- Eurosceptic, is the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Poland is widely known as a country with very strong religious and nationalistic elements, which consequently leads to a non-welcoming approach towards foreigners, especially those not from Europe. The Civic Platform (PO) led by Eva Kopacz had been the ruling party in Poland for almost a decade (2007-2015) and as the migration crisis was looming it started to face tremendous pressure not only from Brussels, but from Poland itself. At first, Warsaw was aligned with the other Visegrad countries against the European Commission's proposal for mandatory binding quotas for the relocation of migrants among the member states. However, the further wave of migration over summer 2015 pushed Brussels to raise

the number that Poland was supposed to admit to 12,000 (2,000 originally) under a revised EU scheme. At this point, the Kopacz government did not respond to the immense pressure from Brussels and started to shift its language, saying that it was prepared to share the burden of the crisis by accepting larger numbers of migrants. The party acted accordingly in September 2015, since at the European Council meeting Poland voted against its Visegrad allies and welcomed an allotment plan involving 66,000 asylum seekers initially (increasing to 120,000 next year) and agreeing to accept 500-5,000 additional migrants (approximately 7,000 in sum). The ruling party defended its rhetorical shift by arguing that the crisis had to be dealt with briskly as to [prevent the collapse of free movement of labor across the EU Single Market zone](#).

But this approach was just grist to the mill for the mildly Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party, especially taking into account the conservative Polish population and its rather distant approach towards foreigners in general. This far-right wing party smartly played on the migration crisis at the expense of the traditional religious question. The party chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński, somewhat scandalously, warned of diseases (cholera, dysentery) being spread by [the 7,000 asylum seekers Poland had agreed to take in](#). The party also accused the Civic Platform of allowing Poland to become Germany's political puppet in the EU and claimed that there are already [European countries that accepted a lot of Muslims](#) and they are slowly becoming "guests in their own country."

The first, highly unexpected, success for the Law and Justice party came in May 2015. The Presidential elections should have confirmed at that time incumbent President Bronisław Komorowski (supported by Civic Platform). However, the relatively unknown Andrzej Duda (backed by the Law and Justice Party) shocked the world by becoming the President. It was considered a significant vote for change; Duda based his [campaign](#) on reduction of the influence of foreign banks and the EU as such, and instead highlighting national sovereignty

and interests (without accepting migrants). Nevertheless, this presidential election took Poland and Europe by surprise. The former rock singer Pawel Kukiz, who turned into a political activist, unexpectedly [gained 21%](#) of votes. Based on this enormous achievement he established the party Kukiz 15, which recorded another [big success with 8,8% of the vote](#). Although this party came up with the idea of organizing [the referendum on whether Poland should accept migrants](#) and is indeed a far-right party, its success has not been based on the migration issue, but more on his charisma and the general dissatisfaction and disillusion among Polish voters.

Nevertheless, the biggest achievement for the Law and Justice Party was still to come. The Civic Platform governed Poland for eight years consecutively, and under their rule the economy remained consistently strong (over 2008-2014, Poland's annual economic growth was 23.8 percent) and the country enjoyed [great relations with its immediate neighbors](#). Moreover, Donald Tusk became the new President of the European Council, which only underlined the growing importance of Poland in the European Union. However, many factors, the stance towards the migration crisis being one of the most significant, contributed to the radical change on the Polish political landscape after the 2015 elections. The Eurosceptic card turned out to be a great asset for Law and Justice, since they gained 37,6% of all the votes (almost 8% more than [in the previous parliamentary elections in 2011](#) and almost 6% more than in [the EP elections just one year ago](#)). This result created an unprecedented situation in the history of post-1989 development for Poland, since Law and Justice did not need any partner to form a coalition and currently constitute a single-party government.

The current government took a completely different stance towards migrants. After the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, the new Prime Minister Beata Szydlo declared that she would not honor the original agreement with Brussels, according to which

Poland was supposed to take in 7,000 migrants. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is the one who is really calling the shots in Poland and is turning Poland into an authoritarian state. Within only two months of ruling, the PiS tightened its grip on the security services, the courts and the civil service and media via the new law that enabled the newly-formed government to take [the state television and radio broadcasters under its control](#). Nevertheless, the radical steps taken by the new government are among many Polish voters perceived negatively, and apart from the numerous mass protests against the new direction the country is heading, there is a significant drop in the popularity of Law and Justice; [according to one of the latest polls it was just 29.3%](#).

The Czech Republic

Extremist groups on a slow rise in the traditionally atheistic country

Until recently the Czech Republic did not have a problem with the extreme right part of the political scene. The Workers' Party (DS) and its successor, The Workers' Party of Social Justice (DSSS) have been presenting themselves as strongly far-right parties: opponents of the registered partnership, proponents of restoring the death penalty, and strictly against NATO and EU membership. But their influence in the Czech Republic was almost negligible - the biggest election success came in 2010 when DSSS gained [1,14% of votes in the parliamentary elections](#).

Nevertheless, the migration issue has caused a significant turn not only among the political parties, but voters as well. It happened in spite of the fact that the number of asylum seekers in the Czech Republic in 2015 was [only 1 235, which represented 0,1% of the applicants in the whole EU](#). The role of media and social networks have been playing a crucial role in this shift of public attitude, since [they have normalized and legitimized racism and xenophobia](#). The Czech Prime minister [Sobotka repeatedly opposed the proposal for the mandatory quota mechanism](#), but at the

same time he underlined that the Czech Republic should be open to help the refugees. This contradictory stance, which was to a certain degree influenced by the pressure for Brussels, was met with [a very sharp reaction from the Czech President Zeman](#), who accused the Social Democrat Sobotka of putting the country in danger by his irresolute opinion on the migration crisis.

However, apart from the controversial President Zeman, who has been very critical of the influx of the migrants in Europe and the way EU has been trying to solve this burning issue, there is another, no less questionable, figure on the Czech political scene who is gaining popularity in the context of the migration crisis. Tomio Okamura started his political career in 2012 as a senator for the district of Zlín. Despite his Japanese roots, [Okamura has tough anti-immigrant views](#). In 2013, he established a party called Dawn of Direct Democracy and in 2014 elections with 6,9% of the vote share made it into parliament. But an inter-party dispute soon followed and Okamura was expelled from his own party. Subsequently he founded a new organization, [Freedom and Direct Democracy \(SPD\) in September 2015](#).

The manifesto of this new party is based primarily on the fight against Muslims and the so-called Islamization process. Okamura is strictly against accepting any immigrants in the Czech Republic whatsoever, because it would endanger freedom and democracy in Europe. He wants to organize [a referendum on seceding from the EU](#). Lately, there have been [numerous protests and demonstrations](#) against Islamization and the EU's dealing with the migration crisis in the Czech Republic, which were organized by Okamura's party. These mostly anti-migration rallies are falling on fertile ground, since the popularity of SPD is on the rise - [in November 2015 it was 2,6%](#), while in April 2016 it was already 4,1%. The original party of Okamura, Dawn, which remained a strictly anti-immigration party and started to cooperate with another controversial person Martin Konvička, son of Greek refugee himself, and his initiative [Block against Islamism](#), is approaching the 5%

parliamentary threshold as well- gaining 4,7% in April this year.

Nevertheless, the duration of this cooperation is more than questionable. The bloc against Islamism was established only in June 2015 and Konvička went even further than Okamura in his statements- " Islamism is not a religion, it is a military ideology", [and his posts on social media](#) - " Muslims should be detained in concentration camps or that meat and bone meal should be made of them." Based on these xenophobic statements, the entomology lecturer at the South Bohemian University is facing judicial charges and can end up in prison for up to three years for incitement of hatred against a group of people or suppression of their rights and freedoms.

The first genuine test of real right-wing extremist power in the Czech Republic will come in October when [local elections are taking place](#). However, it is already apparent that the migration crisis has increased the popularity of far-right and Eurosceptic parties, although in comparison to Poland this growth is much less significant.

Hungary

The role-model for far-right politics and Euroscepticism

Hungary is the only country among the V4 where far-right and Eurosceptic tendencies were quite strong even before the migration crisis broke out. The main reasons for that are generally known: a very deeply-rooted, strong national element in Hungary; a long-standing problem with the [Roma population](#) and its negligence; and last but definitely not least, the scandal of ex-prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's [tape in 2006](#), which basically buried the left side of the political spectrum.

The Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) [was established](#) in 2003 under the leadership of Gábor Vona. It portrayed itself as a highly Eurosceptic party from the very beginning, since it did not run in the EP elections in 2004 as a protest against this initiative. Although the party gained only [2.2% in the 2006 parliamentary elections](#), afterwards they

profiled more as a very strong nationalistic party with hostilities against Roma people, Jews and the LGBT community. As a result of the strong anti-EU and nationalistic rhetoric combined with the disillusionment of the Hungarian voters after the infamous Gyurcsány's tape, the first major success for Vona came in the EP elections in 2009. [Jobbik got 14.77%](#) and in the subsequent parliamentary elections in Hungary one year later it even reinforced its position with 16,67% of the vote share. Moreover, in the 2014 Hungary Parliamentary election, [Jobbik got 20.54 of the votes](#) and became the second strongest party in Hungary after the ruling Fidesz.

As far as the migration crisis is concerned, it is worth mentioning that although the party as such and its leader Vona have highly anti-globalization and anti-immigration views, Vona is unlike other far-right party leaders. He is pro-Islam, even saying: "[Islam is the last hope of humanity in the darkness of globalism and liberalism.](#)"

Although [Hungary granted asylum in 2014 to only 9% of applicants](#), the lowest rate across the entire European Union (average in EU was 45%), since the beginning of the migration in crisis in the first half of 2015 there has been a very vocal campaign against migrants organized not only by Jobbik but also by the ruling Fidesz party and its leader Viktor Orbán.

[The Government did this in three different ways.](#) Firstly, every household received a letter containing a manipulative questionnaire during the spring¹. Secondly, there was an

¹ This letter was a part of the so-called National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism launched in April 2015. It labeled asylum seekers as "economic migrants" and says that "economic migrants cross the border illegally pretending to be refugees, while in reality they seek social allowances and jobs". Following this biased introduction, citizens were challenged to answer questions and to give the questionnaire back to the Government. Whereas the consultation pretended to be a survey, in fact most questions were

intensive billboard campaign² in Hungary directed against migrants. Last but not least, Orbán came up with vigorous actions and speeches directed against the quota system proposed by the EU. The Fidesz representatives deliberately and consistently used the terms "economic immigrants" and "illegal immigrants", suggesting that all these people had left their homelands due to economic reasons and were only pretending to be refugees. The state officials did not differentiate between people coming from war zones potentially deserving asylum status and people who do not come from crisis areas.

Jobbik followed suit and in September 2015 [Vona declared](#): "Hungary has to be able to turn back everyone who arrives at the Hungarian borders as an illegal migrant — everyone without distinction. There is a real humanitarian catastrophe taking place here, but the humanitarian catastrophe is not about what will happen to the poor immigrants. The humanitarian catastrophe is what will happen to poor Hungary."

This harsh anti-immigration stance did not escape the attention of the EU. Consequently, the relationship between Hungary and Brussels deteriorated, especially when Fidesz as well as Jobbik resolutely rejected the quota mechanisms and instead Jobbik proposed a national referendum on this issue. Orbán went even further, in December together with Slovakian Prime Minister Fico filing an official [complaint against the EU](#) for imposing the obligatory migrants' quotas.

The situation in Hungary is the most troubling among all the V4 countries. Non-existing or very weak leftwing parties combined with deeply-rooted excessive nationalistic sentiments that had been craftily used by both

preceded by a statement reflecting the Government's anti-immigration rhetoric.

² The billboard campaign started in June and consisted of three slogans: 1) "If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture." 2) "If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws." 3) "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians' jobs."

Jobbik and Fidesz led to the overwhelming dominance of the right-wing parties. Although the vast majority of Hungarians (73%) still back Hungary's membership in the EU, opinion polls from [April show that 47%](#) of the entitled voters would support Fidesz, which is even more than in the parliamentary elections in 2014 (44,5%) and Jobbik remained the second-strongest party with almost the same result as in 2014 (20%).

These figures are even more frightening taking into consideration that Orbán controls the media and the courts and has acted to reduce the level of democracy in Hungary for several years already. Although only approximately [1,5% of the Hungarian population are migrants](#) and only a negligible percent of the migrants coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan wish to stay in Hungary, Fidesz as and Jobbik are using the situation to gain political points. Nevertheless, it is leading to a cooling of relations between Hungary and the EU and could result in the total isolation of Hungary.

Slovakia

Shocking success of Neo-Nazis in the 2016 elections

The far-right political spectrum in Slovakia was, in the post-1989 landscape, on approximately same marginal level as was the case in the Czech Republic. The Slovak National Party (SNS) is the exception, which is under the leadership of the controversial Ján Slota (1994-1999 and 2003-2012). Slota did not mince his words as far as [Hungarians and Romas were concerned](#), although many times not in a sober condition, and the SNS could be seen as an ultra-nationalistic or even far-right party. Nevertheless, the situation changed with the rise of Marián Kotleba. In 2003 this teacher from Banská Bystrica established a party called "Slovak Togetherness". Members of this party were dressed in black uniforms markedly remindful of the [Nazi-era Hlinka guard](#), the militia of the 1939-45 Nazi-sponsored Slovak State. Moreover, they appeared at rallies commemorating this state and Jozef Tiso, who collaborated with the Nazi regime and ordered the deportation of tens of

thousands of Slovak Jews to concentration camps. Last but not least, their manifesto calls for a radical change of the functioning parliamentary democracy and its replacement with a [corporate system that would divide the society into ten classes](#) and the tenth class would be for minorities who would have restricted rights. Although the party did not attract many voters, it went down in history as the only Slovak party to be disbanded by the Ministry of Interior for spreading hatred in 2006.

However, it did not put off Kotleba's ambitions and Kotleba set up a new political party People's Party-New Slovakia (ĽS-NS) in 2010 and came up with a new appearance and program. He replaced his uniform with a blazer and switched to [anti-Roma³, anti-immigration and anti-corruption rhetoric](#). Suddenly, his party rejected any links with Nazi ideology and emphasized criticism of the European Union and NATO. In spite of that, [latent support for the Slovak state era during the WWII and offensive nationalism](#) remained the main backbones of ĽS-NS. Kotleba's strategy focused mainly on highlighting Slovakia's problems with the Roma people. This caused an unforeseen success in 2013, when he became the [governor of Banská Bystrica region](#) in the election against favorite Vladimír Maňka from the ruling party Smer. [The internet radio station and website Slobodný vysielateľ \(Free Broadcaster\)](#) established at the beginning of 2013 helped Kotleba in this election significantly, as he has been giving a lot of space to ĽS-NS representatives to present their extremist opinions in terms of international relations, Roma problems, etc.

During his tenure as Banská Bystrica region governor he vocally expressed his Eurosceptic or even hateful opinions of the EU. In 2014 on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Slovak state, he [took down the flag of the EU](#), which he considered to be

³ It is estimated that 10% of the Slovak population belong to Roma people, although according to the official statistics is this figure much lower, but the reason for this is that a lot of people do not confess to Roma nationality.

an act of liberation, because the EU and NATO are in his view terrorists.

In 2014, Slovakia received 240 applications for asylum and in 2015, when the migration crisis was already in full swing, this number increased only nominally- to 270 applications. Although only [Croatia](#) received fewer applications among the member countries, Prime Minister Robert Fico (SMER) was one of the toughest opponents of the obligatory quota mechanisms proposed by the EU. After the Paris terrorist attacks he even called for [hiring an extra 2,500 policemen](#) in order to protect Slovakia from the Muslim threat. Fico went even further, when in November 2015 he requested [monitoring of all the Muslims](#) living in Slovakia, which inevitably invoked outrage not only among the human rights organizations, but ordinary people and the EU as well. Apart from that, in December 2015 he launched a [legal challenge to the EU's migration policy](#), which he considers to be a "ritual suicide." Hungary followed his example soon after.

This far-right rhetoric coming from leftist social democratic party was to a certain degree influenced by the imminent parliamentary elections in 2016 . However, Fico did more damage than good, since the depiction of Muslims as an evil that could immediately endanger the Slovak society was a breeding ground for Kotleba and his party, which during the election campaign [spread fear in the least-developed areas](#) in Slovakia.

The 8% of votes received by Kotleba's party in the 2016 election cannot be attributed to the migration crisis solely. The disillusionment of the Slovakian population with the traditional political parties, especially apparent after the Gorilla issue⁴, and the long-standing neglect of the Roma problem also contributed to the unexpected and significant rise of LS-NS (in

⁴ It is a corruption scandal in Slovakia, which came on surface in 2011. It deals with information about politicians and businessmen who are talking about provision in exchange for procurement and other contracts. The allegations have still not been officially confirmed due to alleged shortage of original tapes.

2012 elections only [1,58%](#)). On one hand, this party is ostracized by the other parties. No one wants to cooperate with them, but considering the unusual setting-up of the new government (SMER is in a government with two right-wing parties, whose voters see this coalition as a betrayal), the popularity of Kotleba is still on the rise-[in May 2016 almost 9%](#).

Notwithstanding the fact that LS-NS is the only far-right party in Slovakia and there is no partner on the horizon for them to cooperate with, the boost of support is still very troubling not only for Slovakia but for the whole region. First of all, it is not only a far-right party, but a Neo-Nazi party. Some of its members are on social media actively [avowing as Hitler supporters](#) whilst others have been [downplaying the role of Slovak war state during deportation of Jews](#). Secondly and even more importantly, Kotleba's party was the most successful party among all when it comes to the youngest generation (18-21 years). Almost every fourth young person ([22,7%](#)) [voted LS-NS](#), which should serve as a very strong warning not only for scholars of history, but mainly to contemporary politicians in Slovakia.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the ongoing migration crisis represents the biggest challenge the EU has ever faced. It has placed the unity and harmony of the EU under scrutiny from its outset. Four Central European countries, commonly known as the Visegrad countries, are the key players for resolving this burning issue.

Specifically, the approach towards the migration crisis has become a firm common ground for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. They all resolutely rejected the obligatory quota mechanism proposed by the EU and have all become targets of criticism. Moreover, as a consequence of the migration crisis all of these countries are experiencing a rise in far-right and Eurosceptic tendencies, although in every country to a different extent.

Hungary is the most striking example of a country where the far-right trend is growing. Nevertheless, these tendencies were quite apparent long before the migration crisis, and this state of affairs is connected with strong nationalistic sentiments in the Hungarian population. By all means, the migration crisis reinforced these far-right and Eurosceptic moods and these days, approximately two thirds of the Hungarian population support either Fidesz or the even more extreme Jobbik.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the de-facto leader of Poland, does not conceal his belief that Orbán's everything but democratic regime should serve as an example for his country. The largest Visegrad country is also widely known for its high level of nationalistic awareness. Furthermore, Poland is one of the most Catholic countries in Europe, which makes the promotion of anti-immigration tendencies much easier. Consequently, eight consecutive years of the very successful Civic Platform's government was last year replaced by a populist and Eurosceptic one-party government of the Law and Justice Party, which is slowly but surely turning Poland into a semi-authoritarian state, which is disturbing not only to the EU but to the Polish population, which is storming the streets in masses lately.

The cases of Slovakia and Czech Republic are similar to a certain extent. It is understandable, since they were one state before the fall of the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, the rise of the extreme right in Slovakia is considerably more apparent than in the Czech Republic. Why? Firstly, the Czech Republic is, unlike Poland, one of the least religious- countries in Europe, therefore the animosity towards other religions, in this case Muslims, although still clear, is not as vocal as in the case of Slovakia. Secondly, Kotleba has been on the political scene much longer than Okamura and Konvička and he also has an ace in his sleeve- the Roma question, which is in the Czech Republic by far not as pressing or as neglected as in Slovakia.

The Czech Republic is so far the only country among these four without any far-right party in the parliament. The upcoming Czech parliamentary election next year will put this statement on trial and its results will be also dependent on the progress of the migration crisis until then.